Chain governance structures: the case of the traditional food sector in the EU by Gellynck, Xavier & Molnar, Adrienn
 
 
 
 
 
Chain governance structures:  
The case of the traditional food sector in the EU 
 
 
Xavier Gellynck and Adrienn Molnár* 
 
Ghent University, Faculty of Bioscience Engineering 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Division Agro-Food Marketing 
Coupure Links 653, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium 
Tel: +32 9 264 59 46, Fax: +32 9 264 62 46 
 
*Corresponding author, E-mail: Adrienn.Molnar@Ugent.be 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the 110th EAAE Seminar ‘System Dynamics and 
Innovation in Food Networks’ Innsbruck-Igls, Austria 
February 18-22, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2008 by [Adrienn Molnár and Xavier Gellynck].  All rights reserved.  Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided 
that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
Chain governance structures:  
The case of the traditional food sector in the EU 
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Abstract 
One of the key success factors for facing today’s challenges in business general and in agri-food 
chains in particular is the use of innovative chain governance structures. Based on New 
Institutional Economics this paper studies the different governance structures presented in 
traditional food chains in Europe. First, we use the Transaction Cost Economics’ typology to 
develop an innovative tool tailored to identify the governance of transactions in different agri-
food chains. Second, we tested our typology of governance structures on different traditional 
food products (cheese, beer, dry ham, dry sausage, white pepper) originating from three 
European countries (Belgium, Hungary and Italy). We conducted face to face interviews with 84 
stakeholders from several traditional food supply chains using a structured questionnaire. Our 
findings illustrate that the suggested typology of governance structures is appropriate to compare 
the different governance structures. Future research should focus on validating the instrument in 
other food and non-food sectors.  
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1. Introduction and objective 
 The dynamic character of relations and interdependencies between the different 
stakeholders in business general and in agri-food chains in particular cause a constant challenge 
in today’s business society. One of the key success factors for facing this challenge is the use of 
innovative chain governance structures. Sound chain governance structures allow us to apply 
mechanisms to control quality, to avoid opportunistic behavior of agents (Raynaud 2002; 
Raynaud et al. 2002; Raynaud et al. 2005). Further, these structures contribute fulfilling dynamic 
consumer and market requirements. As a result, there is a growing interest in governance 
structures recently (Goodstein and Boeker 1991). For choosing the most suitable governance 
structures, several variety of governance structures exist between spot market on the one hand 
and vertical integration on the other (Gereffi 2005). But in order to be able to select the most 
appropriate governance structures for our chains, we have to find our own way in identifying the 
criterion that play a large role in determining governance structures. Further, the past, geographic 
and societal environment also have to be considered (Gereffi 2005). This is the underlying 
principle of our study being designed to fill these gaps by developing an innovative tool to 
identify supply chain governance structures. We aim to add to the Supply Chain Management 
literature as well as to New Institutional Economics by enriching the current state of art and by 
developing a novel tool of governance structures.  
This paper is structured as follows: In the following part the methodology of the paper is 
presented. Next, the research results are discussed and finally conclusions are drawn as well as 
further research topics formulated.  
 
2. Methodology 
The above aim is addressed via a two-stage process: 1) Typology development: 
development of a typology of bilateral governance structures, 2) Formatting and pilot testing. 
This two-stage process has been developed adapting the methodologies used by Raynaud et al. 
(2002) and can be considered as an appropriate method for approaching governance structure 
analysis of supply chains.     
a. Methods of typology development (Stage 1) 
In order to evaluate diverse governance structures of the supply chains, it is necessary that we 
are capable to separate different governance alternatives.  Therefore, in the first-stage of the 
process, the literature was reviewed to identify alternative governance structures. Search 
strategies were used to get an inclusive list of publications using keywords related to Transaction 
Cost Economics, governance structure, traditional food and supply chain. Searches were limited 
to English language publications. As a result, an innovative tool tailored to identify the 
governance of transactions in different agri-food chains has been developed inspired by the 
literature (Williamson 1973; Webster 1992; Peterson et al. 2001; Raynaud 2002; Raynaud et al. 
2002; Raynaud et al. 2005; Schulze et al. 2006) containing seven main governance structures and 
nine differentiating criteria.  
b. Methods of formatting and pilot testing (Stage 2) 
Once the innovative tool tailored to identify the governance of transactions in different agri-
food chains has been developed, a questionnaire has been compiled in the second stage of the 
process. This questionnaire was then pilot tested to assess its feasibility between March and May 
2007.  
First, it was decided to conduct face to face interviews in three European countries (Belgium, 
Italy and Hungary). Second, five different traditional food product categories (cheese, beer, dry 
ham, dry sausage and white pepper) have been selected for investigation spread over the three 
countries. Third, different stakeholders within traditional food chains along these five product 
categories were segmented based on their role in supply chains (suppliers, focal companies and 
customers) and recruited. Details about the composition of the face to face interviews are 
provided in Table 1.  
Table 1: Overview of face-to-face interviews 
Country Product Participants1
 
HUNGARY  29 
 White pepper 6 small sized white pepper processing companies (focal 
company)  
2 medium sized white pepper processing companies 
(focal company) 
5 white pepper growers (supplier) 
3 retailers/wholesalers (customer) 
 Dry sausage 3 small sized dry sausage manufacturers (focal company) 
5 medium sized dry sausage manufacturers (focal 
company) 
3 animal breeders (supplier) 
2 retailers (customer) 
ITALY  16 
 Dry ham 4 small sized dry ham manufacturers (focal company) 
2 suppliers of raw materials (supplier) 
2 retailers/wholesalers (customer) 
 Cheese 3 small sized cheese plants (focal company) 
2 suppliers of raw materials (supplier) 
3 retailers/wholesalers (customer) 
BELGIUM  9 
 Cheese 2  micro sized cheese plants (focal company) 
2 milk suppliers (supplier) 
1 wholesalers (customer) 
 Beer 1 micro sized brewery (focal company) 
1 medium sized brewery (focal company) 
1 supplier of malt (supplier) 
1 wholesaler (customer) 
TOTAL  84 participants 
1Micro sized enterprise: < 10 employees, maximum EUR 2 million annual turnover 
 Small sized enterprise: >10 and < 50 employees, maximum EUR 10 million annual turnover 
 Medium sized enterprise: >50 and < 250 employees, maximum EUR 50 million annual turnover 
 
Fourth, it has been decided, that the unit of analysis will be the five main transactions in 
agri-food supply chains, based on the model of Raynaud et al. (2002). This transactional model is 
derived from the main production processes along the chain. The transactions are the following: 
1) Transaction between farmers and their input suppliers, 2) Transaction between farmers and the 
first processing step, 3) Transaction between the first and the second processing steps, 4)  
Transactions between the last processing step and wholesalers and 5) Transaction between 
wholesalers (or the last processing step) and the retailers.  
Fifth, during the interviews the respondents were first asked to graph their supply chain. 
Then each main transaction in the supply chain graph has been given a transaction number, as 
described above. After, each respondent were interviewed related to their main transactions. 
Suppliers evaluated transactions 1 and 2, the focal companies evaluated transactions 2, 3, 4 and 
5, while customers evaluated transactions 4,5 (where relevant). The interviews were audio-
recorded and notes were taken. An interview took between 10-20 minutes.  
Sixth, the interviews have been analyzed and the distribution of the different governance 
structures along the five main transactions has been displayed. Further, the main governance 
structure in each country and in each sector has been presented.  
 
3. Results 
a. Results of typology development (Stage 1) 
The literature review illustrates that a number of typology exists related to governance 
structures (Williamson 1973; Webster 1992; Peterson et al. 2001; Raynaud 2002; Raynaud et al. 
2002; Raynaud et al. 2005; Schulze et al. 2006). The basis for the developed typology is the one 
used by Williamson (1973). This typology allows differentiation of relationships on a market-
hierarchy axis (market, hybrids, firm). However, more comprehensive division among the 
different relationships is also feasible, as shown by Raynaud et al. (2002), Jagdev and Thoben 
(2001), Schulze et al. (2006), Peterson et al. (2001) and Webster (1992). With regard to these 
authors, we developed a thorough description of the different governance structures and 
differentiated seven different bilateral governance structures, namely spot market, non-
contractual relationship with non-qualified partners, non-contractual relationship with qualified 
partners, contractual relationship, relation-based alliances, equity-based alliances and vertical 
integration. Table 2 shows the correspondence with the main typology found in literature and our 
typology.  
 
Table 2: Typology for governance structures 
Market Hybrid Firm (Williamson 
1973) 
Spot market Long-
term 
relation 
Long-
term 
relation 
with 
“qualified 
suppliers” 
Bilateral 
written 
contract 
 Equity 
participation 
Vertical 
integration 
(Raynaud et 
al. 2002) 
Market transaction Non-contractual 
agreement 
Contractual 
agreement 
 Joint 
venture 
Integrated 
company 
(Jagdev and 
Thoben 
2001) 
Spot market Long-term 
relationship 
Contract   Vertical 
integration 
(Schulze et 
al. 2006) 
Spot/cash market  Specifications 
contract 
Relation-
based 
alliance 
Equity-
based 
alliance 
Vertical 
integration 
(Peterson et 
al. 2001) 
Transaction Repeated 
transaction 
Long-term 
relationship 
 Buyer-
seller 
partnership 
Strategic 
alliances 
Vertical 
integration 
(Webster 
1992) 
Spot market Non-contractual 
relationship 
Contractual 
relationship 
Relation-
based 
alliance 
Equity-
based 
alliance 
Vertical 
integration 
Our 
typology 
with 
non-
qualified 
partner 
with 
qualified 
partner 
 
Table 3 specifies the 9 criteria we used to differentiate between the different governance 
structures. These are the followings: 1) Irrelevance of identity, 2) Length, 3) Ex-ante restriction 
on the choice of the partner, 4) Contract specifications, 5) Resource sharing, 6) Joint forces for 
mutual benefit, 7) Intensity of control and 8) Focus of control.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Distinguishing criteria for the different governance structures 
Criteria Spot market Non-contractual relationship Contractual 
relationship 
Relation-
based 
alliance
Equity-based 
alliance 
Vertical 
integration 
  with non-
qualified 
partner 
with 
qualified 
partner
    
Irrelevance 
of identity 
Yes No No No No No No 
Length Short Medium Long Long Long Long  Long 
Ex-ante 
restriction on 
the choice of 
the partner 
No No Yes No            No Yes Yes 
Written 
contract 
No/Yes No No Yes No/Yes Yes Yes 
Contract 
specifications 
Price General 
terms & 
objectives of 
the 
relationship 
General 
terms & 
objectives of 
the 
relationship 
All or part of 
each party 
obligation  
Alliance 
agreement 
Alliance 
agreement 
Governance 
structure 
Resource 
sharing 
Everybody 
own its own 
resources 
Everybody 
own its own 
resources 
Everybody 
own its own 
resources 
Everybody 
own its own 
resources 
Everybody 
own its own 
resources 
Each party 
put resources 
into a new 
entity 
Common 
ownership 
Joint forces 
for mutual 
benefit 
No No No No Yes Yes   Yes  
Intensity of 
control 
Low Low Low Moderately 
low 
Moderate Moderately 
high 
High 
Focus of 
control 
Immediate 
transaction 
Relationship Relationship Contract 
terms 
Relationship Property 
rights of 
stakeholders 
in limited 
joint entity 
Property 
rights of 
stakeholders 
in full entity 
Adapted from: (Webster 1992; Gardner et al. 1994; Van der Vorst et al. 1998; Steele and Beasor 1999; Davies 
2000; Mair; Jagdev and Thoben 2001; Peterson et al. 2001; Raynaud et al. 2002; Claro et al. 2003; Humphreys et al. 
2003; Trent 2005; Lu et al. 2006; Szabó and Bárdos 2006) 
 
b. Results of formatting and pilot testing (Stage 2) 
The questionnaire was formatted to interview suppliers, focal companies and customers. Item 
wording and response categories were determined based on previous studies. Consistency was 
maintained in question formatting.  
At the first part of the interviews, the respondents were first asked to graph their supply 
chains. Two examples of the main structures of the investigated chains are presented in Figure 1 
and 2.  
Figure 1: Hungarian dry sausage chain 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Hungarian white pepper chain 
 
 
Then each main transaction in the supply chain graph has been given a transaction number 
and the main transactions have been analyzed. The distribution of the different governance 
structures in the total sample is shown in Graph 1.  
 
Graph 1: Distribution of governance structures among the respondents 
 
  
The graph shows the diversity of governance structures among the respondents. There is a 
high dominance of contractual relationship (46%) among the transactions, which is followed by 
spot market (21%). Non-contractual relationships with qualified (12%) and with non-qualified 
partners (10%) represent about the same proportion, while the rest of the governance structures 
(relation-based alliance (5), equity-based alliance (3) and vertical integration (3)) were presented 
least of all. The distributions of the different governance structures verify that the developed tool 
for identifying governance structures in agri-food chains are appropriate.  
Now we present country and sector-based differences in governance of the supply chain 
(Table 3 and 4).  
 
 
Table 3: Governance structures in the different countries (%) 
  Belgium  Hungary  Italy 
Spot market  0 29  11
Non‐contractual relationship with non‐qualified partner  0 0  33
Non‐contractual relationship with qualified partner  25 7  17
Contractual relationship  50 64  6
Relation‐based alliance  0 0  22
Equity‐based alliance  13 0  6
Vertical integration  13 0  6
Total  100 100  100
 
The results show vital differences between the different countries. While in Hungary, only 
two governance structures exist and in Belgium, only four, in Italy, all the governance structures 
are represented. This support previous research results (Raynaud 2002), saying that institutional 
environment influence the choice of governance structures. Hence, in the transitional Hungary, 
still sport markets and contractual relationships are dominant, and more trust based relationship 
doesn’t exist, such as relation-based alliances. Further, the relatively higher occurrence of non-
contractual relationship with qualified partners in Italy and in Belgium could be explained by the 
higher number of PDO and PGI certificates (Giraud 2002).  
 
Table 4: Governance structures in the different sectors (%) 
  Chees
e 
Dry 
ham 
Dry 
sausage 
Beer  White 
pepper 
Spot market  6,25 16,67 30,77  0,00  26,67
Non‐contractual relationship with non‐qualified 
partner 
31,25 16,67 0,00  0,00  0,00
Non‐contractual relationship with qualified 
partner 
18,75 33,33 15,38  0,00  0,00
Contractual relationship  12,50 16,67 53,85  75,0
0 
73,33
Relation‐based alliance  12,50 16,67 0,00  0,00  0,00
Equity‐based alliance  6,25 0,00 0,00  25,0
0 
0,00
Vertical integration  12,50 0,00 0,00  0,00  0,00
Total  100 100 100  100  100
 
Table 4 show the variation of the governance structures over the chosen sectors. 
Remarkably, the beer and the white pepper sector only represent two-two governance structures 
(contractual relationship and equity based alliance; and spot market and contractual relationship 
respectively).  
 
In order to see if country or sector-based characteristics drove the distribution of governance 
structures, further analysis is required.   
 
4. Conclusion 
In the frame of our research, we developed an innovative tool for identifying different 
governance structures of agri-food chains via a two stage process.  
First, we reviewed the literature to identify alternative governance structures. As a result, an 
innovative tool tailored to identify the governance of transactions in different agri-food chains 
has been developed containing seven main governance structures and nine differentiating 
criteria. The seven main governance structures are the following: spot market, non-contractual 
relationship with non-qualified partners, non-contractual relationship with qualified partners, 
contractual relationship, relation-based alliances, equity-based alliances and vertical integration. 
Further, nine distinguishing criteria have also been selected to distinguish between the different 
governance structures. These are 1) Irrelevance of identity, 2) Length, 3) Ex-ante restriction on 
the choice of the partner, 4) Contract specifications, 5) Resource sharing, 6) Joint forces for 
mutual benefit, 7) Intensity of control and 8) Focus of control.  
Second, the develop tool has been tested with 84 stakeholders of traditional food chains. The 
results showed the diversity of governance structures among the main transactions, though 
country and sector-based characteristics patterns have been identified, which could bias the 
results.  
In conclusion, our findings illustrate that the develop tool is appropriate for identifying 
governance structures of agri-food chains. Future research could focus on testing the 
methodology and the developed tool in other food and non-food sectors.  
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